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IN AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION—
THE UAE-NORTH AMERICA DISPUTE
RACHID TIROUAL*
ABSTRACT
Subsidy allegations against the three major Middle-Eastern
carriers—Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Air-
ways—have been brought by the three major U.S. carriers—
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines. The lat-
ter claim that the Gulf trio receive letters of credit and subsidies
from their governments. They claim also that their rivals take
passengers and revenues from U.S. carriers and force them to
reduce, terminate, or forego services on international routes.
This article rationalizes the ongoing debate without arguing
whether the subsidy allegations are founded or not. It seeks to
understand the basic rationale behind any findings and conclu-
sions drawn by the different stakeholders that are involved or
concerned by the subject. It is important to shed light on the
conflicts of interests that might harm air transport development
as a whole, and hence the fundamental right of the people: free-
dom of movement and, more specifically, the needs of the peo-
ple for “efficient and economical air transport” prescribed by
Article 44 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.1
* GradCert in Air and Space Law (McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2017);
GradDip in Integrated Aviation Management (McGill University, Montreal,
Canada, 2016); M. Sc. in Transport and Sustainable Development (ENPC, Paris,
France, 2009); and B.Eng. in Process Engineering (ENIM, Rabat, Morocco,
2007). The author is a project manager in the aviation field. He has previously
worked at the Moroccan Civil Aviation Authority as head engineer for the
Department of Strategic and Economic Studies. He was also an observer at the
Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection (CAEP) at the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
1 Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on International Civil Aviation,
art. 44, ICAO Doc. 7300/8, (8th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
The Convention came into force Apr. 4, 1947. Id. at 1, n.1.
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The focus is on the North American region. The air transport
policies and competitive issues are addressed from different na-
tional and international perspectives, specifically, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), national civil aviation authorities, and for-
profit organizations. The analysis is based mainly on scientific
data and legal and regulatory aspects, which are discussed
through a case study of the United States and Canada on the
one hand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE POLICIES AND regulations which have governed theair transport industry for several decades have various moti-
vations to each country. However, unnecessarily restrictive regu-
lations may have led to significant losses of economic efficiency,
and thereby a failure to safeguard an efficient and viable air
transportation to the largest possible proportion of the popula-
tion. In other words, a failure to “[m]eet the needs of the peo-
ples of the world for . . . efficient and economical air
transport.”2
Economic and social benefits have been pointed out as the
very essence of air transport liberalization, which has been an
engine and a catalytic tool of socioeconomic development
within the aviation industry.3 Connectivity has been identified as
a social benefit and considered a secondary effect of
liberalization.4
What is considered by some stakeholders as a benefit occur-
ring from liberalization might be perceived by others as a threat.
Not everyone is convinced of the effects or side effects of com-
petition in air transport, which is the driving force of
liberalization.
One of the fundamental rules of air transport regulation is to
make sure that international air transport services are estab-
lished “on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated
soundly and economically.”5 More specifically, every contracting
State should have “a fair opportunity to operate international air-
2 Id. at 20.
3 Air Transp. Res. Soc’y, Air Transportation Liberalization & the Economic
Development of the Countries 3 (ICAO, Working Paper No. 189, 2016), http://
www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_189_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y7YC-C5Z2].
4 Id. at 4.
5 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 1.
2017] COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 347
lines.”6 Article 44 of the Chicago Convention explains the objec-
tives of ICAO, built upon the message of peace and harmony
among nations mentioned in the preamble.7
According to ICAO,
The liberalization of international air transport regulation con-
tinued to evolve at various levels since the 1980s. It is estimated
that, in 2012, this involved about 35 [percent] of country-pairs
with non-stop scheduled passenger air services and about 58
[percent] of the frequencies offered, through either bilateral
“open skies” air services agreements (ASAs) or regional/pluri-
lateral liberalized agreements and arrangements.8
In order to assist Member States in liberalizing their air ser-
vices, ICAO has set up a Template Air Services Agreement
(TASA) as a comprehensive framework for optional use by
States.9 TASA provides proposals of provisions for bilateral and
regional/plurilateral ASAs based on the model clauses devel-
oped by ICAO and the practice of States in their agreements.10
The template provides explicit explanations of many clauses
throughout its Articles. Likewise, similarities and differences be-
tween various wordings are pointed out depending on the de-
sired degree of liberalization (i.e. traditional, transitional, or full
liberalization).11
Every ten years, ICAO holds a worldwide air transport confer-
ence (ATConf) to examine the key issues and related regulatory
framework governing the development of air transport. In 2003,
the fifth such event (ATConf/5) “gave widespread support for
the concept and contents of the TASA, its optional use by States
in their air services relationships and its further development
6 Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 1, 20. These objectives include: (1) encouraging the arts of aircraft
design and operation for peaceful purposes; (2) meeting the needs of the people
of the world through the development of safe, regular, efficient, and economical
air transport; and (3) ensuring that the rights of contracting States are respected,
and avoiding discrimination between States.
8 ICAO SECRETARIAT, REGULATORY & INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://
www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Documents/REGULATORY%20AND%20INDUS
TRY%20OVERVIEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3FB-CBN2].
9 ICAO SECRETARIAT, WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORTATON CONFERENCE: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF LIBERALIZATION 2 (2003), http://www.icao.int/
Meetings/ATConf5/Documents/atconf5_wp017_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/78D
G-9GRS].
10 ICAO, ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS 1 (2009), http://www.ic
ao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/ICAN2009/templateairservicesagreements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6SW-JKJ8].
11 Id. at 1–2.
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over time by ICAO as ‘living documents.’”12 One decade later,
1,000 delegates and observers from 131 Member States and
thirty-nine international organizations attended the most recent
conference (ATConf/6) held in Montreal from March 18–22,
2013. Among other things, this conference decided that ICAO
should continue to update TASA to keep pace with regulatory
evolution.13
The main outcomes of ATConf/6 are summarized on the ba-
sis of four important points: (1) highlighting air transport policy
as an integral element of a sustainable civil aviation system; (2)
reaffirming the objective of enhanced liberalization and ICAO’s
leadership role in developing related policies and tools; (3)
opening up new perspectives for the modernization of the
global regulatory framework; and (4) providing a basis for con-
crete actions by ICAO.14
In 2014, experts from twenty-seven Member States and eigh-
teen observer States and international organizations partici-
pated in the twelfth meeting of the Air Transport Regulation
Panel (ATRP/12) in order to assist ICAO Secretariat in the AT-
Conf/6 follow-up work.15 It was noted that the work of the ATRP
will take into consideration the interests of all stakeholders, in-
cluding an effective and sustained participation of States in in-
ternational air transport and the ICAO Strategic Objectives for
2014-2016. In that regard, the ATRP has committed to under-
take several actions and measures, including further develop-
ment of ICAO’s policy and guidance material on international
air transport regulation and liberalization. Accordingly, ATRP/
12 considered strategic issues relating to air transport liberaliza-
tion, which include: (1) a long-term vision for international air
transport liberalization; (2) an international agreement for
Members States to liberalize market access and air carrier own-
ership and control; (3) regulatory approaches for fair competi-
tion; and (4) a set of core principles on consumer protection.16
12 Id. at 1.
13 Council of ICAO, Outcome of the Sixth Worldwide Air Transportation Con-
ference 2, 11 (ICAO, Working Paper No. 56, 2013), http://www.icao.int/Meet
ings/a38/Documents/WP/wp056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3V9-P29L].
14 Id. at 4.
15 ICAO, REPORT OF THE TWELFTH MEETING OF THE AIR TRANSPORT REGULA-
TORY PANEL (ATRP/12), ii-1, A1–A4 (June 19, 2014), http://www.icao.int/Sus
tainability/Compendium/Documents/ReferenceDocuments/ATRP12_Report_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5SQ-P4EA].
16 See id. at ii-1–ii-2.
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The International Air Transport Association (IATA)17 advo-
cates that, as a global industry, aviation liberalization “can pro-
vide greater benefits for passengers and allow airlines to operate
on a fully commercial basis.”18 According to IATA, modern,
commercial, and global rules are required to achieve further—
and fuller—liberalization of the global airline industry.19 IATA
believes that the liberalization of operational (i.e. product mar-
ket) and ownership (i.e. capital market) restrictions can be a
very beneficial process despite the difficulty inherent in such
process. In that regard, IATA has analyzed the impact of opera-
tional and ownership liberalization in four other industries—re-
tail banking, energy, telecoms, and media—which share close
parallels with the air transport industry; all are strategically im-
portant, network oriented, and customer-focused. The results
showed that further liberalization will have positive impact for
both consumers and producers.20
IATA points out the existing restrictive bilateral ASAs as an
impediment to the sustainable growth of air transport industry
including air traffic services and airline ownership and control
by foreign nationals.21 IATA notes that the airline industry is
“safer, more accessible and more efficient than ever before”
thanks to airlines.22 IATA urges governments to bring policy in
line with these achievements: “The future success of our indus-
try rests on greater commercial freedom to serve markets where
they exist and to merge and consolidate where it makes business
sense.”23
17 “was founded in Havana, Cuba, in April 1945 . . . . At its founding, IATA had
57 members from 31 nations, mostly in Europe and North America. Today it has
some 265 members from 117 nations in every part of the globe.” The Founding of
IATA, IATA, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/
L5FM-2EHC]. IATA is the trade association for the world’s airlines, representing
83% of total air traffic. It supports airline activity and helps formulate industry
policy and standards. About Us, IATA, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/in-
dex.aspx [https://perma.cc/CMG3-S8AA]. It is headquartered in Montreal, Ca-
nada with Executive Offices in Geneva, Switzerland. IATA Office Addresses, IATA,
http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/offices.aspx [https://perma.cc/6A9Z-NRW2].
18 MARK SMYTH & BRIAN PEARCE, IATA, IATA ECONOMIC BRIEFING NO. 7: AIR-
LINE LIBERALISATION 6 (2007).
19 Id. at 4, 14.
20 Id. at 3–4.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id.
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Air transport services, which are governed by the WTO,24 are
defined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), the WTO’s multilateral agreement on trade in ser-
vices.25 These services are set out in the annex of the GATS on
air transport services, which excludes from the scope of the
GATS: (1) traffic rights, however granted; or (2) services related
to the exercise of traffic rights, except aircraft repair and main-
tenance services, selling and marketing of air transport services,
and computer reservation system services.26
However, these services are subject to a regular review by the
Council of Trade in Services, with a view to considering the pos-
sible further application of the GATS to the sector.27 In that re-
gard, a first review took place from 2000 to 2003, and the second
one is ongoing.28 The WTO works in coordination with the
ICAO and other stakeholders on various aspects, specifically
those related to liberalization of air transport. On that note, the
WTO has developed, in preparation for the second review, the
Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR)
database and methodology, which aims to assess the degree of
liberalization of the air transport.29 Moreover, a study was con-
ducted by the ICAO and the WTO in 2005 to develop the Essen-
tial Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme (ESTDR),
and hence institutional mechanisms to support airlines willing
24 The WTO is a global international organization that deals with the rules of
trade between its 159 member states. See What is the WTO?, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm [https://perma.cc/YS
7U-FMGZ]. The WTO acts as conductor of negotiations of trade agreements, a
tribunal for dispute settlement, a monitor of trade policies, and a trainer to build
trade capacity. See The Four Roles of the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/infocenter_e/brief_roles_e.doc [https://perma.cc/PB5Q-LT75].
The WTO acts as a global police. Between 1995 and 2013, the organization
received more than 400 trade disputes between member states. 75% of these
cases have been resolved by informal consultations between the plaintiffs and
defendants. Countries concerned have generally adopted the recommendations
of the WTO. See CHARLES W. L. HILL ET AL., GLOBAL BUSINESS TODAY 211 (9th ed.
2016).
25 Air Transport Services, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
transport_e/transport_air_e.htm [https://perma.cc/TL8X-RSX6].
26 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1B: Annex on Air Transport Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinaf-
ter Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1B].
27 Id.
28 Air Transport Services, supra note 25.
29 Id.
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to provide certain services of a public service nature.30 The
QUASAR methodology and the role of the WTO in regard to
competition issues and commercial disputes are discussed later
in this Article.
Unlike the international organizations, the objectives and
principles of the air transport liberalization from the perspec-
tives of national authorities and airlines, considered separately,
might vary drastically at large, depending upon the interests of
each stakeholder. What is considered by one as a great benefit
might be perceived by another as a threat. This is more evident
when conflicts occur between parties, which can be either na-
tional authorities (e.g. political disputes, conflicts with other de-
partments within the same State) or airlines (e.g. disputes on
competition). Neither ICAO nor IATA have authority over the
national civil aviation authorities and airlines when it is a matter
of the level of market access.
II. AIR TRANSPORT LANDSCAPE IN THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
A. UNITED STATES
The United States is one of the best examples of market liber-
alization. It has high quality statistics on air travel because of its
size and the relatively lengthy period since it deregulated its do-
mestic market in the late 1970s. Moreover, its “airports have
been most active in pursuing new services, and in evaluating the
economic impacts of aviation.”31
Over the past decade, the United States has been a nexus for
economic growth and air transport development. Between 1996
and 2010, “[U.S.] gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
[grew] by approximately 27% [and] [U.S.] air passenger-miles
for international and domestic travels . . . increased by 52% and
32%, respectively.”32 According to the World Economic Forum
30 ICAO, A Study of an Essential Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme 2
(2005), http://www.icao.int/sustainability/EssentialServicesStudy/EssentialSer
vicesStudy_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MP3-PANG].
31 INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE LIBERALIZA-
TION 10 (2006), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Economic_Impact_of_
Air_Service_Liberalization_Final_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG6B-6623].
32 Junwook Chi & Jungho Baek, Dynamic Relationship Between Air Transport De-
mand and Economic Growth in the United States: A New Look, 29 TRANSPORT POL’Y
257, 257 (2013).
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(WEF), “economic growth plays a crucial role in the expansion
of both air passenger and freight services.”33
In 2014, the U.S. aviation industry generated a total of 5.7
million jobs, of which 2.2 million were direct.34 It also had an
impact of $561.7 billion on GDP, of which $118 billion were in
the tourism industry.35 Moreover, according to the U.S. Travel
Association, domestic and international travelers spent $927.9
billion directly and spurred an additional $1.2 trillion in other
industries.36
Open Skies agreements have vastly expanded international
passenger and cargo flights to and from the United States. Ac-
cording to the Department of Transportation, Open Skies
agreements with over 100 partners have been achieved from
every region of the world and at every level of economic devel-
opment: “America’s Open Skies policy has gone hand-in-hand
with U.S. airline globalization. By allowing U.S. air carriers un-
limited market access to our partners’ markets and the right to
fly to all intermediate and beyond points, Open Skies agree-
ments provide maximum operational flexibility for airline
alliances.”37
However, with the rise of the Middle Eastern carriers and
other foreign carriers (e.g. Norwegian Air Shuttle), Open Skies
agreements “are under attack from an unlikely alliance of do-
mestic airlines and unions.”38 Legacy airlines, “which have tradi-
tionally backed open-skies policies to expand their markets,” are
now claiming the re-evaluation of the objectives of these agree-
ments because of alleged unfair competition from some major
foreign carriers.39
33 Id. at 260.




36 U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, U.S. Travel Answer Sheet—Facts About a Leading American
Industry That’s More Than Just Fun (2014), https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default
/files/Media%20Root/Document/US_Travel_AnswerSheet_DEC2015_final%20
(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/YD2F-N7RD].
37 Open Skies Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/
ata/ [https://perma.cc/H4NF-VVJN].
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Operation of airports by municipal and quasi-municipal gov-
ernments is unique to the United States. The airport workers
are government employees and the airport’s budget is subject to
city or municipal approval.40 Generally speaking, airports are
subject to a heavy regulatory framework dating back to the
Nixon era.41 Also, U.S. airports have traditionally been heavily
“influenced by competitive private interests, particularly by air-
lines that have had the power . . . to shape virtually all the major
aspects of airport development and management.”42
Long-haul travel experienced a 40% growth from 2000 to
2010, while the domestic market showed just a 2% growth dur-
ing the same period.43 In 2014, the United States held the top
rank regarding the number of operating airlines, which was 223.
It ranked second in overall air transport infrastructure, and
ninth in terms of quality. However, it ranked 128th out of 141
countries in price competitiveness related to ticket taxes and air-
port charges, being among the highest in the world.44
Even though U.S. airports are essential for the country’s de-
velopment, they suffer from heavy government controls and
frameworks and lack of revenues. This is due to the Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) regulated fares. According to the
WEF Report, this has caused the United States to fall to the
thirty-first position in airport development.45 The United States
restricts foreign ownership of domestic and international air-
lines to 25%, though it “has allowed up to 49% foreign owner-
ship on a case-by-case basis.”46
40 MIKE TRETHAWAY, AIRPORT OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT & PRICE REGULATION
4–6 (2001), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Airport_Ownership_Man
agement_and_Price_Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCZ4-5L3L].
41 See generally THERESA L. KRAUS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1903–2008 25–44 (2008), https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/media/historical_perspective
_ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YDA-VK9P].
42 RICHARD DE NEUFVILLE, AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION ISSUES FOR THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1999).
43 Kate Rice, U.S. Travel Associations Dow Details Impact of 9/11 on Travel Business,
TRAVEL PULSE, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.travelpulse.com/news/features/us-tra
vel-associations-dow-details-impact-of-911-on-travel-business.html [https://perma.
cc/ZB2T-D8VS].
44 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2015 339 (Roberto Crotti & Tiffany Misrahi, eds., 2015), http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/TT15/WEF_Global_Travel&Tourism_Report_2015.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/S9UR-QJWQ].
45 Id. at 43.
46 DAVID GILLEN, COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW PANEL, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RE-
STRICTIONS IN THE CANADIAN AVIATION INDUSTRY: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 2
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During the period between 2011 and 2015, as the economy
was returning from the 2008 economic crisis, the financial re-
sults of U.S. airlines continued to show improvement as the in-
dustry was being restructured. In 2015, the industry recorded
one of the strongest profitability reports; “the top 10 U.S. sched-
uled passenger airlines, based on operating revenue, reported
an after-tax net profit of $24.2 billion . . . up from a profit of
$7.3 billion in 2014.”47 These airlines included American Air-
lines, Delta, United, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Hawaiian,
Spirit, SkyWest, and Frontier.48 They “carried 81.9 percent of
U.S. airlines’ scheduled service passengers in 2015 and ac-
counted for 94.6 percent of the scheduled passenger airline af-
ter-tax net profit.”49
It is expected that in the next twenty years, due to a long-term
nationwide economic recovery, passenger and cargo traffic will
experience annual growths of 2.7% and 3.8%, respectively.50 On
the other hand, some of the major issues looming include (1)
allegations by U.S. airlines that the three major Middle Eastern
carriers are violating competition rules; and (2) labor claims by
workers at Southwest and Delta that demand better pay and re-
ject recent labor contracts.51
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code describes
the requirements and process of reorganization of the business
affairs and assets of debtors, in this case financially troubled cor-
porations. In that sense, a reorganization plan is set to assess the
debtor’s fulfillment of its obligations. Chapter 11 presents an
opportunity for the company to avoid bankruptcy and allows the
(2008), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/vwapj/David_Gillen.pdf/
$FILE/David_Gillen.pdf (“In May 2003, the [U.S.] government proposed raising
the allowable percentage of total foreign voting stock ownership to 49%, but this
is still being debated.”) [https://perma.cc/3VUW-N6FE].
47 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS (BTS), BTS RELEASES
2015 AIRLINE FINANCIAL DATA 2 (2016), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/press_re
leases/bts026_16 [https://perma.cc/3TEY-L8B9].
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 2.
50 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUS., National
Travel & Tourism Strategy Task Force on Travel & Competitiveness (2012), http://
travel.trade.gov/pdf/national-travel-and-tourism-strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
24MX-KLWA]; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA Aerospace Forecast: Fiscal Years
2016–2036, at 9, 19 (2016) https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aero
space_forecasts/media/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf.
51 Susan Carey, Three Big U.S. Airlines Allege Additional State Subsidies to Qatar
Airways, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2016; Susan Carey, Dark Clouds Loom for Airlines Even
as Their Profits Take Off, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2015, at A1.
2017] COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 355
creditors to receive some form of payment for amounts owed to
them by the debtors.52 However, it is worth noting that debtors
need not be “insolvent” to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition.53
It is deemed to be in debtor-company’s interest to file early
for Chapter 11 because it provides it with “wide-ranging and val-
uable powers.”54 These include the right to “disclaim, adopt or
assign contracts,” and most importantly, “the ability to sell assets
and borrow money.”55 In fact, the directors of these debtor-com-
panies remain responsible to all constituents; they “may act to
maximize the values for all, including negotiating on behalf of
existing equity-holders.”56 Therefore, the debtor is enabled to
“address its business and operational issues, including its rela-
tionship with unions and its pensions.”57 In contrast, in the
United Kingdom for instance, debtors do not have such powers
under its administration procedure.58 On top of that, it is ar-
gued in large Chapter 11 cases that existing management have
benefited from generous compensation and severance incen-
tives in order to remain with the company during the reorgani-
zation process. In another vein, it is claimed that debtors could
use Chapter 11 as a delaying tactic when dealing with creditors
and opponents in litigation.59 Perhaps that is the reason why the
Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005 to “include an 18 month
‘drop-dead date’ for exclusivity in Chapter 11 cases,” and “re-
strict significantly the circumstances under which incentives can
be granted.”60
According to the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO), airline bankruptcies’ overall duration averages
52 Ch. 11 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://
perma.cc/E6XP-JE4Z].
53 JONES DAY, COMPARISON OF CH. 11 OF THE U. S. BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH THE
SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE U. K., THE RESCUE PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, IN-
SOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN GERMANY, AND THE EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATION
FOR LARGE INSOLVENT COMPANIES IN ITALY 8 (2007), http://goo.gl/In4tb9
[https://perma.cc/5FMA-VXBX] [hereinafter COMPARISON OF CH. 11].
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 13.
57 Id. at 14.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 10.
60 Id. at 10, 13.
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714 days. This duration is higher than the average of all indus-
tries, which was 518 days.61
The longest and costliest bankruptcy in aviation history was
United Airlines, which reemerged in 2006 after 1,150 days in
bankruptcy.62 The airline was able to slash costs by $7 billion per
year and cut out $8 billion of its debt, but it still had to deal with
$17 billion of the remaining debt. Furthermore, a new manage-
ment incentive plan was adopted following the period of reor-
ganization despite the “angry” opposition of the union; the
disputed plan “reward[ed] 400 executives with a total of 10 mil-
lion stock shares, 8% of the reorganized company.”63
B. CANADA
“Historically, Transport Canada approached the issue of bilat-
eral air service negotiations on an ad hoc basis that featured in-
cremental negotiations.”64 In November 2006, Canada adopted
a new approach to international air access named Blue Sky by
Transport Canada.65 The criteria to be considered in determin-
ing Canada’s negotiating priorities include the following factors:
61 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-945, COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
BANKRUPTCY AND PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL
ISSUES 23–24 (2005).
62 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY: THE POST-DEREGULATION EPI-
DEMIC 33 (2012), https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/aspl613_paul_dempsey_
airlinebankruptcies2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4WM-G8Q4].
63 Marilyn Adams, Has United Changed Enough?, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-01-22-united-cover-usat
_x.htm [https://perma.cc/BD5D-WQZ2].
64 LIBERALIZATION IN AVIATION: COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
446 (PETER FORSYTH ET AL. eds., 2013).
65 Id. Blue Sky policy has the following objectives:
“[p]rovide a framework that encourages competition and the devel-
opment of new and expanded international air services to benefit
travellers, shippers, and the tourism and business sectors[;]
[p]rovide opportunities for Canadian airlines to grow and compete
successfully in a more liberalized global environment[;] [e]nable
airports to market themselves in a manner that is unhindered by
bilateral constraints to the greatest extent possible[;] [s]upport and
facilitate Canada’s international trade objectives[;] [s]upport a
safe, secure, efficient, economically healthy and viable Canadian air
transportation industry.”
The following principles guide the approach of the Blue Sky pol-
icy: “[r]ecognize that air transportation is a direct contributor to a
dynamic economy and is a leading trade and tourism facilitator[;]
[m]arket forces should determine the price, quality, frequency and
range of air services options[;] Canadian carriers should have the
opportunity to compete in international markets on a reasonably
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Canadian airline and airport priorities and interests; [l]ikelihood
and extent of new Canadian and foreign carrier services, giving
preference where early start-up of air services is planned; [s]ize
and maturity of the air transportation markets and potential for
future growth; [f]oreign government requests; Canada’s interna-
tional trade objectives; [s]afety and security issues; [f]oreign rela-
tions; and [b]ilateral irritants and disputes.66
The Blue Sky policy emphasizes that “[a]s a primary objective,
Canada will seek to negotiate reciprocal ‘Open Skies’-type agree-
ments, similar to the one negotiated with the [United States] in
November 2005, where it is deemed to be in Canada’s overall
interest.”67
“Until the early 1990s [Canadian] airports were managed by
the federal government.”68 Since then, Canadian airports have
been corporatized. The government still maintains ownership of
the airports through emphyteutic leases however, which “set out
the governance and consultation mechanisms under which the
airports are run” by not-for-profit entities.69 Thus, these entities
bare the operating and funding responsibilities under the long-
term leases.70
According to Daniel-Robert Gooch, president of the Cana-
dian Airports Council (CAC): “Canada essentially has a ‘user pay
PLUS’ system for aviation in which users pay for airport infra-
structure, security screening and air traffic control, plus a little
extra to the federal government.”71
Gooch noted that over $19 billion have been invested in air-
port improvements under this system since 1992.72  As a result,
the WEF in 2015 ranked Canada’s overall air transport infra-
structures first worldwide ahead of the United States and the
level playing field[;] [a]ir liberalization initiatives will continue to
be guided by safety and security considerations.”
See TRANSP. CAN., BLUE SKY: CANADA’S NEW INTERNATIONAL POLICY 2 (2006),
https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/policy/bluesky.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y74U-Q9CL].
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
68 Daniel-Robert Gooch, Why Canada’s Airport Model is Working for Taxpayers,
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UAE, respectively.73 Canadian airports ranked sixteenth in
terms of quality.74 However, the same report ranked Canada
130th out of 141 countries, among the highest in the world, in
terms of price competitiveness related to ticket taxes and airport
charges.75
“Canada limits foreign ownership of Canadian air carriers to
25%.”76 In the current aviation market, Air Canada, Air Transat,
WestJet, and Porter Airlines, which operate scheduled and char-
ter services domestically and abroad, represent the main air car-
riers in Canada.77 “Air Canada is extending its global reach
through its membership in Star Alliance and through its partici-
pation in a transatlantic revenue sharing joint venture with
United Airlines and Deutsche Lufthansa AG, referred to as
A++.”78 Furthermore, the flag carrier often considers code-shar-
ing as a “preliminary step to either achieve more comprehensive
Joint Ventures . . . or in some cases, to introducing [its] own
aircraft on a new route.”79 It is worthy to note that in 2003, the
biggest issue looming was the financial difficulties faced by Air
Canada.80 At that time, the national carrier managed to keep its
membership in Star Alliance thanks to its partner United Air-
lines, though airlines are required to meet certain financial obli-
gations to maintain their membership.
Similar to Chapter 11 in the United States, the Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) allows financially troubled
Canadian corporations to restructure their financial affairs
73 THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITVENESS REPORT 2015, supra note 44, at 113,
335, 339.
74 Id. at 113.
75 Id.
76 GILLEN, supra note 46, at 1.
77 Brian Spiegel, List of Canadian Airlines, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usato
day.com/list-canadian-airlines-63316.html [https://perma.cc/7DU4-RE46].
78 AIR CANADA, 2013 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF
OPERATIONS AND FINANCIAL CONDITION 4 (2014), https://www.aircanada.com/
content/dam/aircanada/portal/documents/PDF/en/quarterly-result/2013/20
13_MDA_q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS8K-HG5J].
79 Calin Rovinescu, CEO, Air Canada, Remarks to the Vancouver Board of
Trade 12 (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.aircanada.com/content/dam/aircanada
/portal/documents/PDF/speeches-presentations/en/vancouverBoard_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4TH-AFEK].
80 Keith McArthur, How Creditors Saved Air Canada, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (May
3, 2004), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/how-creditors-
saved-air-canada/article1137095/ [https://perma.cc/WRU6-EFVS].
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through a formal Plan of Arrangement.81 In contrast with Chap-
ter 11, among other things, a Canadian debtor must be “insol-
vent” and “have in excess of C$5-million in liabilities” to be able
to make a voluntary application for relief under the CCAA.82
Canadian “[c]orporations that do not reach this $5 million
threshold can utilize the Division I Proposal under the Bank-
ruptcy and Insolvency Act.”83 Moreover, “the stay of proceedings
is not automatic” in Canada.84 Nevertheless, “a broad initial stay
up to a maximum of 30 days” can be issued by courts, typically
exercising their discretion.85 In addition, while there is no time
limit on the stay under Chapter 11, an extension of the initial
stay can be granted upon application to the Court under the
CCAA. The “debtor must demonstrate that it is acting in good
faith and with due diligence.”86 Another point concerns the le-
gal bankruptcy estate, which is created upon the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition, but is not under the CCAA.87
“Air Canada entered bankruptcy in April 2003, emerging in
September 2004.”88 Among the benefits gained from CCAA Pro-
tection, the carrier was able to cut its costs by $2 billion, which
included “$1 billion labour and benefits; $0.6 billion in aircraft
lease rentals (49% cut in cash rent from 2003 to 2009); and $0.4
billion in supplier contracts and other.”89
C. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UAE’s
non-oil GDP was expected to grow at 4.4% in 2015,90 and it grew
81 What is CCAA?, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS CANADA, http://www.pwc.com/
ca/en/services/insolvency-assignments/what-is-ccaa.html [https://perma.cc/
3ND2-FS2C].
82 BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP, CHAPTER 11 AND CCAA: A CROSS-BORDER
COMPARISON 1 (2013), http://www.blakesfiles.com/Guides/Blakes_Restructuring
_and_Insolvency_Canada.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8DG-9Z23] [hereinafter Ch.
11 & CCAA].
83 What is CCAA?, supra note 81.
84 CHAPTER 11 AND CCAA, supra note 82, at 2.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 3.
88 DEMPSEY, supra note 62, at 20.
89 Aircraft Commerce, Air Canada’s Post-Bankruptcy Re-Organisation, 38 AIRCRAFT
ANALYSIS & FLEET PLANNING 24 (December 2004/January 2005).
90 Waheed Abbas, UAE’s Non-Oil GDP to Grow at 4.4% in 2015: IMF, EMIRATES
24/7 (May 5, 2015), http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/
uae-s-non-oil-gdp-to-grow-at-4-4-in-2015-imf-2015-05-05-1.589693 [https://
perma.cc/C9HU-ZPD9].
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by 2.5% in 2016.91 Transport and tourism are fundamental sec-
tors driving the UAE economy in that perspective. Aviation has
established itself as a vital contributor to the UAE’s economy
contributing more than AED 145 billion ($39.47 billion) or
14.7% of the national GDP.92 It is expected to contribute 32% to
Dubai’s GDP by 2020, according to government estimates.93
Carla Slim, the Middle East and North Africa economist at Stan-
dard Chartered bank, explained: “This announcement reflects
the success of Dubai’s economic strategy. . . . It cements Dubai’s
position as a major tourist destination in the region but also as a
gateway for trade, logistics and regional services.”94
“The UAE has signed more than 160 [bilateral] . . . ASAs, of
which [the] majority are Open Skies arrangements.”95 Despite
this liberal approach, the UAE still has some restrictive ASAs
with “limits on capacity, designated airports and, in some cases,
approved airlines and pricing.”96 According to a study con-
ducted by InterVISTAS Consulting, “it is possible that restric-
tions within an ASA are not due to the policies of the UAE
government but due to the policies of the opposite [signatory]
country.”97 Generally, governments require reciprocity when ne-
gotiating the terms of a bilateral Air Service Agreement.98
91 Solid Profitability Seen for Top UAE Banks, TRADEARABIA (Feb. 14, 2017), http:/
/www.tradearabia.com/news/BANK_320726.html [https://perma.cc/PB9Q-
UNG3].
92 OXFORD ECON., ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM AIR TRANSPORT IN THE UAE 4, 14
(2011), https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/Benefits-of-Aviation-UAE-
2011.pdf
93 UAE Economy, UAE EMBASSY, http://www.uae-embassy.org/about-uae/uae-
economy [https://perma.cc/ZBE8-GS8D].
94 Mahmoud Kassem, Aviation Expansion to Give Some Lift to UAE Economic
Growth, THE NATIONAL (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.thenational.ae/business/avia
tion/aviation-expansion-to-give-some-lift-to-uae-economic-growth [https://per
ma.cc/32AG-KXU3].
95 Press Release, Reed Exhibitions, Open Skies Remains in the Frontline of
UAE’s Winning Aviation Strategy (May 14, 2014), http://www.reedexpo.com/fr/
Press-Releases/2014-Press-Releases/Open-Skies-remains-in-the-frontline-of-UAEs-
winning-aviation-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/E6EU-499C] [hereinafter Open
Skies Remains in the Frontline].
96 INTERVISTAS-EU CONSULTING, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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Dubai is a long-term supporter of Open Skies with over 100
international airlines flying to its international airport.99 In fact,
the government of Dubai considers the Open Skies policy as a
“key component of its economic and trade policy.”100 According
to Mohammed Ahli, Director General of Dubai Civil Aviation
Authority:
Dubai is one of the true pioneers of aviation liberalisation having
adopted an open skies policy as one of the cornerstones of its
economy ever since late Sheikh Saeed bin Maktoum Al Maktoum
O.B.E signed the Dubai Commercial Air Agreement with His
Majesty’s Government in July 1937, long before Emirates was es-
tablished in 1985. Access to Dubai, one of the world’s largest and
fastest-growing hubs, allows carriers of the world to grow their
services and also boost exports and trade to their own markets.
For Dubai it gives consumers more choice, stimulates traffic
growth and is good for business. Considering that ICAO predicts
there will be 6 billion people travelling by air in 2030 compared
to 3 billion today. Dubai is well-placed to capitalise on this
growth. I am confident that Dubai’s steadfast commitment to
Open Skies is a source of inspiration for other countries.101
As a result of the government policy, it is “estimated that $82
billion have been invested in aviation infrastructure develop-
ment in the Emirate of Dubai alone since the formation of the
UAE in 1971.”102 The country has six international airports.103
Since 2014, Dubai International Airport has “become the
world’s busiest in terms of international passenger traffic ahead
of London-Heathrow.”104 With almost 70 million international
99 International and Government Affairs: Connectivity, Competition and Consumer
Choice, EMIRATES, http://www.emirates.com/english/about/int-and-gov-affairs/
international-and-government-affairs-new.aspx [https://perma.cc/8KZ6-WURZ].




102 Open Skies Remains in the Frontline of UAE’s Winning Aviation Strategy,
supra note 95.
103 Planning a Trip, EMBASSY OF THE U.A.E. IN WASHINGTON, D.C., http://www.
uae-embassy.org/about-uae/travel-culture/planning-trip [https://perma.cc/
VL4U-89VF].
104 Press Release, Airport Council International, ACI World Releases Prelimi-
nary World Airport Traffic and Rankings for 2014 - DXB Becomes Busiest Airport
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passengers in 2014, Dubai International Airport was ranked the
“sixth busiest airport in the world in overall passenger traffic.”105
The overall air transport infrastructures in the UAE were
ranked third worldwide by the WEF, and second in terms of
quality.106 In addition, the UAE ranked twenty-fifth out of 141
countries, among the highest in the world in terms of the price
competitiveness related to ticket taxes and airport charges.107
This is attributed mostly to its world-class international hubs for
global air travel.108
“Foreign ownership and control of airlines in the UAE is re-
stricted to a 49% equity stake.”109 Four of the UAE’s five na-
tional airlines are 100% state-owned: Emirates Airlines, Etihad
Airways, Air Arabia, and Fly Dubai.110 Rotana Jet is owned jointly
by Amiri Flight (50%) and Abu Dhabi Aviation (50%).111 Emir-
ates, followed by Etihad, are by and large the biggest national
carriers and two of the major players in the international air-
lines industry.112 Besides, it is worth noting that the two airlines
have different strategic approaches: while Emirates’ strategy is
based on the liberalized bilateral ASAs, Etihad favors equity mi-
nority interests. Unlike Qatar Airways, Emirates does not belong
to an alliance. The airline emphasizes its concerns about the
anti-competitiveness of some traditional alliance arrange-
ments.113 Emirates instead prefers codeshare agreements with
potential partners to “reinforce Dubai’s standing as a global
hub.”114
105 Id.
106 THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2015, supra note 44, at
335.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 18.
109 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE ON LIBERALIZATION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), supra note 96, at iii.
110 Id.; Company History, FLYDUBAI, https://www.flydubai.com/en/information
/about-flydubai/company-history [https://perma.cc/J55C-BQ4J].
111 Your Abu Dhabi Guide, UAE AIRLINES, http://www.yourabudhabiguide.com/
uae-airlines.html (last visited Jun. 19, 2017); About Us, ROTANA JET, http://www.
rotanajet.com/About-us (last visited Jun. 19, 2017).
112 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE ON LIBERALIZATION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), supra note 96, at 13.
113 Ben Flanagan, Etihad and Emirates Show Airline Alliances are Outdated, THE
NATIONAL, Sept. 1, 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/etihad-
and-emirates-show-airline-alliances-are-outdated [https://perma.cc/YF8R-W678].
114 International and Government Affairs: Connectivity, Competition, and Consumer
Choice, supra note 99.
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D. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE MAJOR MIDDLE-EASTERN
CARRIERS IN THE UNITED STATES
The three major U.S. carriers—American Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, and United Airlines—claim that their rivals from the Mid-
dle East—Qatar Airways, Emirates Airlines, and Etihad Air-
ways—receive letters of credit and subsidies from their
governments (in the form of assumption of fuel hedging
losses).115 They also claim that the Middle Eastern carriers take
passengers and revenues from U.S. carriers, and force them to
reduce, terminate, or forego services on international routes.116
Therefore, a fifty-five-page white paper was addressed to the U.S.
government by the three U.S. major airlines in January 2015.117
William S. Swelbar, a researcher at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and a member of the OneJet Advisory Team,
studied in a position paper the impacts of the alleged subsidies
at different levels. His analysis was based on the fifty-five-page
white paper. According to Swelbar, the first results expected in-
clude: (1) the reduction of the U.S. network carriers’ [and their
alliance partners’] share in key markets (notably, the Middle
East and Indian subcontinent); and (2) the shifting of connect-
ing passengers to the Middle–East–traffic diversion.118
Swelbar explained that the Middle Eastern carriers’ services
threaten the viability of nonstop flights with greater economic
impact than connecting flights at the three major airports—
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or Doha. He added: “routes with strong local
markets need to rely less on connecting passengers to reach
route profitability, enhancing the economic benefits of such ser-
vice to both communities.”119 Another argument is that small-
and medium-sized airports in the United States are negatively
impacted by the Middle Eastern carriers, which operate in
115 PARTNERSHIP FOR FAIR AND OPEN SKIES, RESTORING OPEN SKIES: THE NEED TO
ADDRESS SUBSIDIZED COMPETITION FROM STATE-OWNED AIRLINES IN QATAR AND THE
UAE 1, 27, 28 (2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/wp-content/themes/
custom/media/White.Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MT-3JVV] [hereinafter
RESTORING OPEN SKIES].
116 Id. at 46.
117 See generally id.
118 WILLIAM SWELBAR, VIOLATIONS OF “FAIR AND EQUAL” OPEN SKIES AGREE-
MENTS THREATEN LARGE AND SMALL AMERICAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ACCESS TO
THE GLOBAL AIR TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 2 (2015), http://www.openandfair
skies.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Open-Skies-Violations-Threaten-Ameri
can-Communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7LW-6Y3Z].
119 Id. at 6.
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nearby hubs and therefore “threaten[ ] the viability of existing
domestic flights.”120
Swelbar’s analysis is based on data that certainly show the
strong growing position of the Middle Eastern carriers in the
U.S. market, yet the alleged subsidies were rather considered as
an upheld hypothesis of the study. To the contrary, the veracity
of these allegations should have been questioned. In fact, the
same reasoning would apply and the same conclusions would be
drawn if other competitors of the U.S. airlines were considered
as being subsidized. For instance, Ethiopian Airlines, Cathay Pa-
cific, Singapore Airlines, and Kuwait Airways121 operate fifth
freedom routes from some U.S. airports, but so does Emirates,
since 2013, by flying from New York to Milan and continuing on
to Dubai.
Therefore, Swelbar’s approach is misleading the reader by as-
suming the allegations against the Middle Eastern carriers are
true on the basis of the white paper drawn by the complainants.
In fact, Swelbar advocates for the Partnership for Open & Fair
Skies, which is a coalition composed of American Airlines, Delta
Air Lines, and United Airlines, along with some associations of
pilots and flight attendants.122
On the other hand, the fifty-five-page white paper pointed out
some alleged anti-competitive financial advantages and irregu-
larities contained in the released financial statements of the
Middle Eastern carriers.123 Moreover, the focus was laid on some
120 Id. at 10.
121 Kuwait Airways dropped its New York City-to-London route in December
2015 after a discrimination complaint was filed by the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, which threatened legal action over the carrier’s refusal to sell tickets to
Israelis. However, the carrier has since started operating the same route again.
Ben Schlappig, Kuwait Airlines’ Controversial London to N.Y. Flight is Still Operating
(Sort Of), ONE MILE AT A TIME (Mar. 21, 2016), http://onemileatatime.boarding
area.com/2016/03/21/kuwait-airways-jfk/ [https://perma.cc/3BYA-9KSC].
122 New Report: Violations of Open Skies Threaten Small and Large Communities Across
the Nation, PARTNERSHIP FOR FAIR & OPEN SKIES (July 23, 2015), http://www.open
andfairskies.com/press-releases/violations-of-open-skies-threaten-small-and-large-
communities/ [https://perma.cc/2HXC-GA2L]. The associations of pilots and
flight attendants include the Air Line Pilots Association International, the Allied
Pilots Association, the Airline Division of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, the Association of Profes-
sional Flight Attendants, the Communications Workers of America, and the
Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association. Who We Are, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR
SKIES, http://www.openandfairskies.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/U4S7-
LS9C].
123 RESTORING OPEN SKIES, supra note 115, at 12.
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local regulation advantages that benefit the Gulf trio. These in-
clude, for instance, the labour rights management.124 According
to this paper, John O’Connell, Senior Lecturer at Cranfield Uni-
versity, has observed that: “Emirates has the advantage that la-
bour laws in the UAE forbid strikes and there are no trade
unions, thus ensuring smooth flight operations and continuous
services.”125
However, it should be noted that Swelbar did not consider the
complexity and multidimensionality of global regulatory
frameworks. It is true that the three major U.S. carriers are un-
ionized, yet their ability to reconsider the terms of their employ-
ees’ contracts is more flexible than that of their competitors in
Europe (e.g. Air France, Lufthansa). The latter are, in fact,
bound by strict regional and national (read: social) regulations.
For instance, in October 2015, Air France executives faced rabid
reactions from furious striking staff after the airline cut 2,900
jobs.126 Subsequently, this number was reduced to 1,000 jobs by
2016.127 Though such a reaction would not be conceivable in
the U.S. context, Delta Air Lines, perhaps coincidently, an-
nounced at the same time its plan to cut an unspecified number
of jobs from its administrative workforce.128
Another argument has been raised by Delta Air Lines, which
is leading a U.S./EU fight for action against the Middle Eastern
carriers’ “alleged predatory pricing and capacity dumping prac-
tices.”129 However, Kevin Mitchell, the Founder and President of
the Business Travel Coalition, claimed that dumping is “a prac-
124 Id. at 36.
125 John F. O’Connell, The Rise of the Arabian Gulf Carriers: An Insight into the
Business Model of Emirates Airline, 17 J. OF AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 339, 344 (2011).
126 Kim Willsher, Air France Workers Rip Shirts From Executives After Airline Cuts
2,900 Jobs, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/oct/05/air-france-workers-storm-meeting-protest-executives-job-losses-paris
[https://perma.cc/JH56-EJKK].




128 Michael Sasso, Delta Air Plans Cuts in Office Workforce to Boost Productivity,
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 2, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02
/delta-air-plans-cuts-in-office-workforce-to-boost-productivity [https://perma.cc/
686R-838L].
129 Kevin Mitchell, Why Are The BIG 3 Silent On Consumer Harm From Gulf Carri-
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tice used and perfected by U.S. major network airlines over de-
cades in their domestic market against low-cost new entrant
airlines.”130 For instance, on November 10, 2015, the Depart-
ment of Justice sued “to block a proposed deal between United
and Delta airlines to swap access between their New York City-
area hubs, in an effort to preserve competition at Newark Lib-
erty International Airport.”131 On the whole, the aforemen-
tioned white paper raises arguments or hypotheses on alleged
subsidies, which require a technical and global analysis based on
internal data from the alleged Middle Eastern carriers. This pro-
cess makes the verification of any information somewhat impos-
sible to fulfill from one side.
In that sense, Emirates has clarified that its accounts are au-
dited by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in compliance with in-
ternational standards and are publicly available.132 Emirates
denies receiving State subsidies other than the start-up seed cap-
ital in 1985 and claims, rather, that it provides financing to the
government of Dubai through dividend payments:
In 1985 Emirates received US$10 million from the Government
of Dubai in start-up seed capital and US$88 million invested in
infrastructure, which included two Boeing 727 aircraft and the
Emirates Training College building. This has been more than re-
paid by dividend payments to the Government of Dubai, which
have totalled US$2.3 billion to date. The Dubai Government and
the management of Emirates have consistently made it clear that
Emirates is required to be self-sustainable and profitable.133
Unlike Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways do not release de-
tailed financial reports, which makes it difficult to establish any
finding and, more importantly, to determine the exact size of
eventual subsidies.134 Yet this cannot be considered in any way as
an illegal matter since it is entirely within the right of [non-pub-
130 Id.
131 Bart Jansen, DOJ Seeks to Block United and Delta Deal for Newark Access, USA
TODAY, Nov. 10, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2015/11/
10/doj-seeks-block-united-and-delta-deal-newark-access/75511350/ [https://
perma.cc/BE59-QH9N].
132 EMIRATES AIRLINES, AIRLINES AND SUBSIDY: OUR POSITION 10 (2012), http://
content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/int_gov_affairs/airlines_and_subsidy
_our_position.pdf [https://perma.cc/8243-8V3Z].
133 Id. at 8.
134 Ted Reed, Etihad and Qatar Airways Report Earnings, So to Speak—But Are They
for Real?, FORBES, June 20, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2015/
06/20/etihad-and-qatar-airways-report-earnings-so-to-speak-but-are-they-for-real/
#50a3d3e376a1 [https://perma.cc/9W3S-K2XE].
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lically traded] companies to publish or not their financial
reports.135
On an academic level, a recent paper from the University of
Maryland examined direct and secondary impacts of Middle
Eastern carriers’ competition on U.S. airlines’ international traf-
fic and fare levels. The analysis concluded that this competition
is associated with (1) direct impacts: significant growth in
U.S.–Middle East traffic volumes; and (2) secondary effect: small
but statistically significant traffic losses and fare reductions for
U.S. carriers in route markets connecting the United States with
Africa, Asia, Australia, and Europe.136
According to this study, relatively few academic papers have
examined the impacts of the Middle Eastern carriers on the air
travel market. Nevertheless, Jay Squalli’s work is considered as a
notable exception in that regard.137 Squalli studied the relation-
ship between the performance of Emirates and the air transport
liberalization. He analyzed 155 route markets originating in
Dubai and concluded that: “further liberalization of the UAE
market (and, by extension, other Gulf carriers’ markets) leads
to greater passenger volumes, lower fares and, ultimately, wel-
fare gains.”138
So far, the analysis of the aforesaid studies shows that there is
a conflict of interest between different stakeholders in the
United States. Two main groups have been identified in regard
to the ongoing debate on fair competition and the allegedly sub-
sidized Middle Eastern carriers: (1) the three major U.S. airlines
and more than six associations representing together the group
Partnership for Open & Fair Skies;139 and (2) the Business
Travel Coalition (BTC), a U.S. advocacy organization,whose ob-
135 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
International Transport Forum: Interview with Alain Lumbroso (Mar. 2016); Private
Company Research, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/com
pany/private.html [https://perma.cc/3PS9-76JA].
136 Martin Dresner et al., The Impact of Gulf Carrier Competition on U.S. Airlines,
79 TRANSP. RES. PART A: POL’Y AND PRAC. 2–3 (2015), http://www.business
travelcoalition.com/documents/theimpactofgulfcarriercompe.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7LT5-854T].
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id.; see also Jay Squalli, Airline Passenger Traffic Openness and the Performance of
Emirates Airline, 54 QUARTERLY REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 138 (2014).
139 See Who We Are, supra note 122.
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jective is to “bring transparency to industry and government pol-
icies and practices.”140
From a trade and global development perspective, the U.S.-
UAE commercial-aviation relationship generated in 2012 more
than $16 billion in benefit to the United States (direct spending
and spinoffs), more than 100,000 jobs, and over $1.6 billion in
tax revenue, according to the U.S.-UAE Business Council.141
Based in Washington, D.C., the U.S.-UAE Business Council
promotes and advocates trade and commercial opportunities
between the two countries. It counts almost 100 members, rang-
ing from public and private corporations, which represent the
interests of both countries. In that regard, Emirates, Etihad,
Boeing, and Lockheed Martin count among thirty-four found-
ing members. Additionally, FedEx is a corporate member, and
the American Business Council of Dubai and the Northern
Emirates is an honorary member.142
From a manufacturer perspective, Boeing (and Airbus as well)
is benefiting hugely from the continuing growth of the Middle
Eastern carriers at spectacular rates (i.e. expansion of the
fleets). For instance, Emirates is currently the world’s largest op-
erator of the 777 and the only airline that operates all the vari-
ants of this aircraft. During the Dubai Air Show, in 2013,
Emirates announced an order for one-hundred fifty 777Xs,
which is considered a record for the single largest airplane or-
der ever in the world.143
From a consumer perspective, the Middle Eastern carriers
stimulate demand, offer passengers more choice, and pressure
the U.S. airlines to improve their product and service offerings.
As a matter of fact, the Middle Eastern carriers have adopted a
competitive strategy based on an aggressive head-to-head com-
petition with their rivals worldwide. In response to the alleged
subsidies, Emirates clarified that it “filled a gap in the market by
taking travelers to new destinations not served by [others], and
140 About, BUS. TRAVEL COAL., http://www.businesstravelcoalition.com/about/
untitled.html [https://perma.cc/R2TH-M6LP].
141 ROB BRITTON, U.S.-U.A.E. COMMERCIAL AVIATION: TAKING FLIGHT – THE
WORLD’S FASTEST GROWING BILATERAL AVIATION RELATIONSHIP 1 (2013), http://
usuaebusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/US-UAE-aviation-report_Pub
lished.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXX-GKUW].
142 Membership, U.S.-U.A.E. BUS. COUNCIL, http://usuaebusiness.org/member-
ship/ [https://perma.cc/M4ZG-WHXY].
143 Emirates’ $76 Billion Boeing Aircraft Order a Boost to US Aviation Industry, EMIR-
ATES (Nov. 18, 2013) http://www.emirates.com/us/english/about/news/order-
boeing.aspx?intcid=carousel-637518-1443005 [https://perma.cc/Z43Y-ZDC2].
2017] COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 369
helped contribute to [U.S.] economies, trade, and tourism.”144
Also, Emirates emphasized that it “provides a much-needed
competitive alternative to the three airline alliances with anti-
trust immunity permitting them to keep fares artificially
high.”145
The latter point ties in with a similar conclusion of Timothy
John Hazledine, Professor at University of Auckland, who stud-
ied the impacts of Emirates’ service in Trans-Tasman air mar-
kets. Indeed, Hazledine concluded that “Emirates offered
significantly lower fares but did not exert much pricing pressure
on incumbent carriers Air New Zealand and Qantas.”146
That being said, in 2016, Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad
were respectively ranked second, first, and sixth out of the 100
best airlines by Skytrax.147 The rankings are based on the votes
from millions of travelers from around the world. Skytrax World
Airline Awards are “coveted Quality accolades for the world air-
line industry.”148
E. CANADA/UAE RESTRICTIVE BILATERAL ASA
David Gillen, Director of the Centre for Transportation Stud-
ies at the University of British Columbia, underlined different
metrics to be considered for assessment of the Canadian Blue
Sky policy. These include the number and type of treaties, who
the treaties are with, and the impact on passengers, cargo, and
the economy. With this regard, Gillen highlighted in his analysis
important facts vis-a`-vis:
•The institutional framework and process: the number of negoti-
ating teams which has not been adjusted (increased) since the
adoption of the Blue Sky policy.
•The number of signed ASAs: prior to the Blue Sky policy, be-
tween 1949 and 2004, fifty ASAs were signed (over a period of
fifty-six years). From 2005 to 2009, fifteen ASAs were signed a
144 American Consumers and Regional State Economies the Ultimate Victims of US Car-





146 Dresner et al., supra note 136, at 3; see also Tim Hazledine, Pricing, Competi-
tion and Policy in Australasian Air Travel Markets, 44 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 37
(2010).
147 The World’s Top 100 Airlines in 2016, SKYTRAX, http://www.worldairlinea
wards.com/awards/world_airline_rating.html [https://perma.cc/CW3T-M5EZ].
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rate three times that prior to 2005 which may be considered as a
huge success; these include the Open Skies Agreements with
the European Union (EU) and the United States.149
Gillen pointed out other metrics as necessary to assess the im-
pact of the Blue Sky policy in terms of its initiation and facilita-
tion of the negotiation process. However, the lack of available
data would not allow him to proceed in that purpose, which is
due, according to him, to the secrecy characterizing this process
within the institutional framework.150
Gillen estimated a mathematical model of total international
passengers against numbers of ASAs. Besides the negative effect
of the distance on the total number of passengers with an elas-
ticity of -0.67, the impact of the degree of liberalization on total
number of passengers was the main result of the study. In fact,
countries with an Open Sky agreement with Canada have signifi-
cantly more passenger flows, followed by liberal ASAs, which
also have higher passenger flows. Ultimately, it was noted that:
(1) the impact of Open Skies agreements is nearly four times
larger than a less liberal ASA; and (2) “the Blue Sky policy intro-
duced in 2005 has had no statistically significant impact on total
passenger flows between Canada and its top 50 international
passenger destinations.”151
Under the UAE-Canada ASA, designated airlines from both
parties—Etihad, Emirates, and Air Canada—are permitted to
operate three weekly flights between Toronto and Dubai.152
Emirates began flying the Dubai-Toronto route in October
2007. These flights have been consistently operated at capac-
ity—even after the A380 was put on the route in 2009.153 Since
then, the UAE has been “pushing” for a more liberalized ASA.
Nevertheless, the negotiations between the two countries, which
lasted several years, resulted in little to no progress.154 In No-
149 Forsyth et al., supra note 64, at 447–48.
150 Id. at 448.
151 Id. at 454.
152 Alexander Cornwell, Air Canada: We Will Oppose More Flights for Emirates,
Etihad, GULF NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/air-
canada-we-will-oppose-more-fligths-for-emirates-etihad-1.1614329 [https://per
ma.cc/PVY7-QSD2].
153 EMIRATES, EMIRATES & CANADA 1 (2016), https://cdn.ek.aero/downloads/
ek/pdfs/int_gov_affairs/Emirates_and_Canada_June_2016.pdf [https://perma.
cc/33HU-G9D3].
154 The Canadian Press, Emirates Pushing Canada on Air Travel, CBC NEWS, Oct.
10, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/emirates-pushing-canada-on-air-
travel-1.925223 [https://perma.cc/63NZ-HUU7].
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vember 2010, it was reported that Canada was prepared to offer
more landing slots at the Calgary and Vancouver airports de-
spite Air Canada’s objection to any increased service for UAE
carriers. Air Canada argued that such an expansion of landing
rights would harm Air Canada because few passengers fly from
the UAE to Canada and that UAE carriers are carrying passen-
gers beyond their hubs (sixth freedom),155 which will harm Air
Canada.
The UAE was not satisfied with anything less than more flights
to Toronto.156 In fact, it was reported that Canada’s offers in-
cluded a capacity cut instead of a capacity increase, meaning
that the offers were of little value to the UAE, and so the UAE
negotiators were accordingly offended.157 The dispute over com-
mercial airline landing rights soured relations between the two
countries and led to the Canadian Forces getting evicted from a
key military transit base near Dubai.158 Moreover, the UAE de-
cided to pursue visa reciprocity towards Canada, among other
countries, by the end of 2010.159
Surprisingly, in 2012, some reports indicated that Air Canada
had proposed a joint venture with Emirates in 2006 “in which
the two airlines would share equally in profits from increased
flights between the [UAE and Canada].”160 Yet Yves Dufresne,
Vice President of Alliances and Regulatory Affairs at Air Canada,
minimized the relevance of this information.161 According to
Dufresne, this was somehow propaganda circulated as a result of
Transport Canada’s refusal to increase landing rights for Emir-
ates and Etihad in 2012.
In 2014, Emirates submitted a paper to the Canada Transpor-
tation Act Review 2014, in which it considered the UAE-Canada
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ASA as one of the most restrictive agreements. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, Emirates explained that Canada is the only country that
allows just three weekly flights, among eighty countries to which
Emirates operates passenger services.162
Table 1: Canada’s stance on airline competition from an
Emirates perspective compared with other G7
members
G7 Member Emirates entitlement Frequencies/week 
UK Open Sky 112
US Open Sky 77





Source: Emirates Airlines (2014)
The paper emphasized that Emirates is a fully commercial air-
line operating a transparent and non-subsidized business model,
and as mentioned earlier, its accounts are audited by PwC in
compliance with international standards, and are publicly
available.163
In his address to the Standing Committee on International
Trade at the House of Commons of Canada, Ian Smith, Presi-
dent of the Air Canada Pilots Association (ACPA), declared in
2015:
I mention this to address two fronts that are concerning our asso-
ciation at this time. One is the continued attempt by Emirates
Airline to expand its foothold into Canada . . . . When applying
the blue sky policy, it is essential to understand that Emirates Air-
line operates under a completely different business model and
completely different rules. Unlike Air Canada, Emirates Airline is
an extension of Dubai’s government, whose economic develop-
ment strategy is to expand its airline market share at other coun-
tries’ expense. Emirates Airline is a subsidiary of the Emirates
162 EMIRATES, EMIRATES SUBMISSION TO THE CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT RE-
VIEW, 3–4 (2014), INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENT AFFAIRS,
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ctareview2014/pdf/Emirates%20Submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9Z3-GHCL].
163 Id. at 1.
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Group of companies, which integrates the airline into its airport
operations in Dubai. With near limitless state capital funding, a
tax-free environment, foreign low-cost labour to build infrastruc-
ture, and a state-owned airline, Dubai has been transformed into
a major collection point, commonly called a hub.164
Smith believed that Emirates’ move will damage the sus-
tainability of the Canadian aviation sector and, consequently,
harm national interests. He noted that the domestic aviation
market is presently at its upper saturation limit—with a popula-
tion of almost 36 million.165
Overall, these statements appear to be akin to the allegations
of the major U.S. carriers against the Middle Eastern carriers at
large.166 However, unlike the situation in the United States, it is
important to note that some stakeholders are not involved in
the current debate in Canada. This includes the tourism indus-
try and most importantly the end users—passengers.
In 2013, the Tourism Association Industry of Canada (TAIC)
published a paper addressing its position on Open Skies policy
in Canada. This paper analyzed the potential impacts and inter-
actions of the Canadian air policy with the tourism industry.167 It
outlined three interrelated perspectives that should be consid-
ered in any improvements in air access to Canada: (1) “Cost
Structure: [e]ven with a liberal air access agreement, Canada’s
prohibitively expensive aviation cost structure will continue to
dissuade foreign carriers from doing business with Canada”; (2)
“Facilitation: Canada must be able to meet the anticipated in-
creased demand” from a more liberalized ASA by rectifying out-
standing immigration issues such as Transit Without Visas,
Canada Border Services Agency staffing capacity; and (3) ASAs:
“Open Skies policies alone will not increase international visita-
tion. However, with the right aviation policies in place ([points]
1 and 2) Canadian tourism may benefit from more liberalized
ASAs in specific cases.”168
164 Air Canada Pilots Association, House of Commons, Standing Comm. on




166 Compare id. with RESTORING OPEN SKIES, supra note 115.
167 ADRIENNE FOSTER, TOURISM ASSOCIATION INDUS. OF CAN., GATEWAY TO




374 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
With regard to the passengers, it seems that the policymakers
and airlines do not bother to mention how high air fares are in
both the domestic and international markets. Admittedly, Cana-
dian airports have been run by not-for-profit entities since they
were corporatized in the 1990s, yet the end users—passengers—
have to bear the cost of the investments on airport facilities by
paying high fees to ensure a return-on-investment of the airport
facilities (“user pay PLUS” system, as explained earlier in this
article).169 Ticket taxes and airport charges are pointed out as
real issues facing air transport development in Canada.170 In
2012, 23% of the total Origin/Destination (O/D) transborder
passengers used neighboring U.S. airports. This represents a
leakage of traffic of 6.4 million passengers, 5 million of which
are Canadian residents.171 Mary-Jane Bennett concluded, in her
study, that leakage of passenger traffic in Canada is due mainly
to the lack of competition as a result of the exorbitant costs
(base fare and charges) leading to increasingly high fares in the
aviation market in Canada.172
On the other hand, a recent article by Centre Asia Pacific Avi-
ation (CAPA) examined the recent withdrawal of Delta Air
Lines from its Dubai route (announced on October 28, 2015)
due to competition with Emirates.173 The article noted the coin-
cidence of this move with the new service launched by Air Ca-
nada to Dubai (on November 3, 2015) and Delhi (on November
1, 2015). The article considered Canada as overtly protectionist
and concluded that from a passenger perspective, “open skies in
the [U.S.] has delivered extensive benefits while protectionism
in Canada is limiting travel options and the economy.”174
169 Gooch, supra note 68.
170 INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE COST
COMPETITIVENESS OF CANADIAN AVIATION: IMPACTS ON AIRPORTS AND AIRLINES 3, 56
(2008), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Aviation_Competitiveness_Re
port_16Jan2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/D93T-56ZS].
171 CANADIAN AIRPORTS COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AIR TRANSPOR-
TATION INDUSTRY IN CANADA 10 (2013), http://www.cacairports.ca/sites/default/
files/Docs_2013/CAC_Economic-Impact-Study_FINAL_April-2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VK29-62MG].
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III. APPLICATION OF CASE STUDIES TO PRINCIPLES OF
COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORT
The definition of a level playing field in the international
trade is often a source of confusion. In fact, a conflict of interest
is most likely to occur when various stakeholders are involved in
complex processes within different environments, and hence,
different conditions of operation (e.g. labor standards, taxes).
An equilibrium is not easy to achieve when potential benefits for
a party are more of threats for others. In that regard, Appelman
et al. explained:
Pleas for a level playing field, for instance in international trade,
are often not well-founded. This is because it is not exactly clear
what a “level playing field” means. But even if it would be clear
what the plea would imply, a level playing field is not always desir-
able from an economic perspective.175
Appelman et al. defined the concept of “level playing field”
according to two approaches: First, “a rules-based level playing
field, which suggests that all players in a market are treated the
same in equal circumstances” regarding various criteria such as
labour standards, taxes, and subsidies.176 In other words, all
firms compete under symmetric rules in an international mar-
ket.177 Second, “an outcome-based level playing field, which
means that all firms in a market have the same expected profit,”
therefore, disadvantaged firms are compensated by the govern-
ment.178 In that case, asymmetric rules are adopted to level the
playing field; that is, corrective measures are designed to ad-
dress the distortions caused by unfair advantages.179 Appelman
et al. pointed out two fundamental points with regard to the
applicability of both approaches: (1) “a rules-based level playing
field is desirable, although there are reasons to deviate from this
assumption”; and (2) “it is never desirable to pursue a fully out-
come-based level playing field, but that it may be desirable to
175 MARJA APPELMAN ET AL., CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ANALYSIS, EQUAL RULES OR EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES? DEMYSTIFYING LEVEL PLAYING
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level the playing field to a certain extent in the case of market
failure.”180
Based on the above, the definition of the level playing field
and the applicability of the concept rely on the appreciation of
the mechanisms governing international markets. That is to say,
interpretations from different perspectives hence different in-
terests depending on the specifics and complexity of each
industry.
In that sense, the definition will be even more complex for
the aviation system, which is based by definition on the interna-
tional market mechanisms from regulatory, legal, and opera-
tional perspectives. For instance, as mentioned earlier, ICAO
developed, conjointly with WTO, the Essential Service and Tour-
ism Development Route Scheme (ESTDR), which was “a mecha-
nism whereby a support, in the form of a financial subsidy and/
or an exclusive concession, can be provided to airlines for the
provision of certain services of a public service nature.”181 The
experience of route support schemes has raised many questions
regarding the appropriate manner by which the process of sub-
sidy allocation should be set so that any distortion of market and
unfair competition are avoided, i.e., the playing field has to be
leveled.182
Jaap G. de Wit, Professor of Transport Economics at Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, clarified that even with equal rules for inter-
national trade and identical economic and institutional policies
(i.e. rules-based level playing field), trading partners may still
benefit from comparative advantages. As a result, the playing
field is unlevel, yet De Wit noted that this “cannot be qualified
as unfair competition.”183
180 Id. at 89.
181 A Study of an Essential Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme, supra note
30, at 1.
182 Jon Woolf, Dir. & Principal Consultant at ASM, Address to the ICAO Glob.
Symposium on Air Transp. Liberalization: Air Service Development for Develop-
ing Countries 23 (Sept. 18–19, 2006), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/Liberaliza
tionSymposium/Documents/2006-Symposium-Dubai/Woolf.pdf [https://perma
.cc/CF89-BVNX].
183 Jaap G. de Wit, Unlevel Playing Field? Ah Yes, You Mean Protectionism, 41 J. OF
AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 22, 24 (2014); see also Ian Fletcher, Time to Quit Pining for a
“Level Playing Field” in International Trade, GLOB. GEOPOLITICS & POLITICAL ECON.
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/03/18/time-to-
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The theory of comparative advantage suggests that free trade
stimulates economic growth within a country. That is based on
the trading of goods that can be produced most efficiently in
such a way as to offset the disadvantages in areas where goods
are produced less efficiently compared to other countries. As a
whole, trade is a positive-sum game, according to the theory of
comparative advantage.184
Theoretically, comparative advantages and disadvantages are
supposed to be assessed by the negotiating parties on an individ-
ual basis throughout the negotiation process. The outcome of
such assessment permits each party to compare the consistency
of its own endogenous and exogenous parameters (e.g. eco-
nomic measures; institutional policies vs. geographic location)
to that of the other parties. This process allows, at the same
time, parties to determine the Best Alternatives to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA), which is the most valuable alternative
course of action to be considered if negotiations fail and an
agreement cannot be reached.185
As for aviation, the comparative advantage/disadvantage ap-
proach is more difficult to achieve given “that aviation has been
separated from general trade negotiations.”186 As a result, “the
issue of the level playing field plays an inordinately larger role in
aviation than in other sectors.”187Nevertheless, many aspects in
aviation remain consistent with this perspective. For instance, as
explained earlier in this article, Dubai considers the Open Skies
policy “a key component of its economic and trade policy.”188
Overall, the national institutional policies play in favor of the
aviation system as a whole in the UAE and Qatar.189 In addition,
the geographic location is pointed out as a major advantage for
the Middle Eastern carriers; that is, international hubs enable
carriers to benefit from operations between the United States
and Asia Pacific, as well as Europe and South Asia/East Africa.190
On the other hand, Boeing and Airbus benefit in return from
184 de Wit, supra note 183, at 24.
185 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 51–52 (1992).
186 MIKE TRETHEWAY & ROBERT ANDRIULAITIS, INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, WHAT
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the rapid growth of the Middle Eastern carriers as discussed ear-
lier in this article; this is due to the comparative advantage of
the United States and Europe in high tech manufacturing and
skilled labor for the production of the largest aircraft tailored to
the Gulf trio, i.e. the A380 and B777.191 Besides, the U.S. ap-
proach in air transport liberalization has been advocating for
competition rules by reducing the burden of regulation that is
to ensure equality of opportunity for the different players.192 In
fact, the United States was the first country to start pursuing
Open Skies agreements following the “International Air Trans-
portation Negotiations Statement of U.S. Policy for the Conduct
of the Negotiations,” which was issued by President Carter in
1978.193 According to this statement:
The guiding principle of U.S. aviation negotiation policy will be
to trade competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions, with
our negotiating partners. We will aggressively pursue our inter-
ests in expanded air transportation and reduced prices rather
than accept the self-defeating accommodation of protectionism.
Our concessions in negotiations will be given in return for pro-
gress toward competitive objectives, and these concessions them-
selves will be of a liberalizing character.194
One of the fundamental rules of air transport regulation is to
make sure that international air transport services are estab-
lished “on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated
soundly and economically.”195 Hence as discussed earlier, the
objective of ICAO is to “[i]nsure that the rights of contracting
States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a
fair opportunity to operate international airlines.”196
On another note, Annex 1B of the GATS does not cover the
“largest part of air transport services: traffic rights and services
directly related to traffic.”197 However, it is worthy to note that
“traffic rights” include, by definition, “tariffs to be charged and
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International
Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 435, 435, 441–42 (1994).
194 Jimmy Carter, International Air Transportation Negotiations Statement of U.S.
Policy for the Conduct of the Negotiations, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 21,1978),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31218 [https://perma.cc/LSP3-
ML7M].
195 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 1.
196 Id. at 20.
197 Air Transport Services, supra note 25.
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their conditions.”198 Likewise, commercial disputes related to
the subject of paragraph 3 of the Annex are not covered by the
GATS (i.e., aircraft repair and maintenance services, the selling
and marketing of air transport services, and Computer Reserva-
tion System (CRS) services).199
Therefore, the GATS’ procedures of dispute settlement can
be applied to air transport services other than the above issues
such as unfair competition caused by “unlawful” subsidies. Even
though these procedures can only be invoked when certain con-
ditions are met and as a last resort to be relied upon only after
other alternatives (i.e. clauses of bilateral ASAs). In fact, para-
graph 4 of the GATS’ Annex on air transport services, specifies
that “[t]he dispute settlement procedures of the Agreement
may be invoked only where obligations or specific commitments
have been assumed by the concerned Members and where dis-
pute settlement procedures in bilateral and other multilateral
agreements or arrangements have been exhausted.”200
From a regulatory perspective, it should be noted that there is
almost no comprehensive descriptive clause referring to anti-
competition or unlawful subsidies in the existing bilateral ASAs.
For instance, the Open Sky agreement between the United
States and the UAE has a very vague referral to competition is-
sues. Article 11 of this agreement states that “[e]ach Party shall
allow a fair and equal opportunity for the designated airlines of
both Parties to compete in providing the international air trans-
portation governed by this Agreement.”201
Moreover, it is specified on the first page of the agreement
that, among other things, both countries “[d]esire to promote
an international aviation system based on competition among
airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interfer-
ence and regulation.”202 The word “minimum” is vague and sub-
jective, which opens the door to different interpretations of how
a “minimum government interference and regulation” should
or shall be defined.203
198 Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1B, supra note 26, at 307.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates U.A.E.-U.S., 8, Mar.
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On the other hand, settlement of disputes is discussed under
Article 14 of this agreement, which includes disputes on compe-
tition issues.204 Likewise, Article 14 explains the process of for-
mal consultations and arbitration by a tribunal of three
arbitrators.205 A comparison of Article 14 of the U.S.-UAE agree-
ment with Article 34 of the ICAO TASA206 mainly shows the
following:
• Article 14 of the US-UAE Open sky agreement is somehow
based on the second arbitration approach defined by ICAO.
• The wording of paragraph 7 of Article 14 complies with the
first option of the paragraph 8 of Article 34, which limits the
enforcement of the decision or award of the arbitral tribunal:
“[e]ach Party shall, to the degree consistent with its national
law, give full effect to any decision or award of the arbitral
tribunal.”
• The use of commas instead of square brackets in the ICAO
proposal may modify the meaning or the scope of the forego-
ing paragraph.207
It should be noted that under the provision of the second op-
tion of paragraph 8 in Article 34, “the decision of the tribunal
shall be binding on the Parties.”208
Consequently, the U.S.-UAE Open Sky agreement does not
provide explicit information or examples that answer the follow-
ing questions: How should an accepted level of government in-
terference and regulation be defined? How should the playing
field be leveled so that any distortions of market and unfair com-
petition are avoided? And, more importantly, how shall the con-
tracting parties proceed when commercial disputes occur?
As for the United States’ allegations of capacity dumping, tar-
iffs to be charged and their conditions, or any other matter re-
204 Id. at 10.
205 Id.
206 ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 75–83. Article
34 on settlement of disputes provides an explicit description of the dispute reso-
lution process, which depends on whether the ASA is traditional or fully liberal-
ized. Id. Article 34 may exclude disputes on competition issues if the contracting
parties decide to include a separate consultation process under Article 15 on fair
competition. See id. at 75.
207 Compare ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 80–82,
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DE LA TRADUCTION (2017), http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tcdnstyl-chap?
lang=eng&lettr=chapsect7&info0=7 [https://perma.cc/H54F-E53C].
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lated to traffic rights, the plaintiff should invoke Article 14
(Settlement of Disputes) and Article 12 (Pricing) in the current
US-UAE Open Sky agreement.209 Given that commercial dis-
putes cannot be resolved based on the vague provisions of Arti-
cle 14, parties cannot take any legal actions, per allegations of
financial subsidies, under the current bilateral ASA. Thus, un-
less airlines involved in that issue foresee their future growth
through partnerships when possible instead of exchanging use-
less allegations, the only recourse should be a specialized juris-
diction based on views of experts in the subject matter of the
dispute. In that sense, the WTO is the international body em-
powered to examine questions that bear on commercial dis-
putes (as explained previously in the GATS’ Annex on Air
Transport Services).
Consequently, based on foregoing analysis, and given the
ASAs’ limited scope, plaintiffs should request the intervention of
the WTO in cases of commercial disputes related more specifi-
cally to alleged financial subsidies, which may distort the mar-
ket. Even though there is no mention to the WTO in the overall
existing bilateral ASAs in case of a dispute relating to unfair
competition, perhaps it is the will of civil aviation regulators to
maintain the status quo by resolving possible disputes under the
bilateral ASAs without any referral to an organization outside
the aviation sphere or diplomatic channels of both parties—in
the worst scenario.
IV. CONNECTIVITY AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN
AIR TRANSPORT
Air transport connectivity is defined in line with the Chicago
Convention as inter alia Preamble and paragraph D of Article
44: “[m]eet[ing] the needs of the peoples of the world for . . .
efficient and economical air transport.”210 Accordingly, connec-
tivity in air transport is defined by ICAO as the “[m]ovement of
passengers, mail and cargo involving the minimum of transit
points, which: makes the trip as short as possible, with optimal
user satisfaction; [and] at the minimum price possible.”211
In 2015, a commentator said:
209 See US-UAE Agreement, supra note 201, at 9–10.
210 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 20.
211 A. Sainarayan, Chief, Aviation Data & Analysis Sec., ATB, Workshop at the
ICAO’s 39th Assembly: Air Connectivity and Competition (Sept. 27, 2016), http:/
/www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops/Documents/Air%20Connectivity%20
and%20Competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L9F-4JPG].
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“Connectivity” which is the most compelling need in aviation,
and embodied in the Chicago Convention as inter alia “meeting
the needs of the people of the world for efficient and economical
air transport” is stultified by interests of commercial and national
policy . . . . The [U.S. position]212 makes one wonder whether
the fate of air transport lies in internal job creation and not in
connecting the world which is the main intent and purpose of
the Chicago Convention.213
In 2012, the numbers of cities served from twenty-four major
hub airports across the globe were ranked according to three
different measures with different outcomes. In terms of domes-
tic and international flights (i.e., total cities served and total in-
ternational destinations), Frankfurt—FRA with 313 cities served,
is the largest, followed by Paris—CDG with 268. For the United
States, Atlanta—ATL ranked third (228) and Chicago O’Hare—
ORD ranked fifth (210). In Canada, Toronto—YYZ ranked
eighth (183) in a tie with New York—JFK (183) and London—
LHR. Finally, Dubai—DXB ranked fifth with 313 cities served.214
In the context of international flights only, the geographical
location of the hub airports must be considered when “examin-
ing how airport rate as international hubs on connectivity.”215 In
that regard, European hubs rate well since they have “a majority
of their service within Europe that is included as interna-
tional.”216 For similar reasons, Dubai Airport also scores well in
terms of the number of international destinations served, com-
ing in third behind Paris—CDG and Frankfurt—FRA.217
As for outside the region, an alternative measure considers
the “number[ ] of cities served outside the hub airport’s local
region.”218 “Dubai[—DXB] is the largest international hub air-
port on this measure, followed by Frankfurt—FRA, Paris—CDG
and New York—JFK.219 Toronto—YYZ and Montre´al—YUL also
fare well on this measure; Toronto ranked sixth just behind New
212 The author refers to the recent allegations of the three major U.S. airlines
against the Gulf carriers.
213 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, What in the World is Happening to Air Transport?, SRI
LANKA GUARDIAN, May 5, 2015, http://www.slguardian.org/2015/05/what-in-the-
world-is-happening-to-air-transport/ [https://perma.cc/Z9PV-7VYQ].
214 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN CANADA,
supra note 171, at 16–17.
215 Id. at 16.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 17.
218 Id. at 16.
219 Id. at 16–17.
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York—JFK and London—LHR, and Montre´al ranked tenth.”220
“The Asian hub airports don’t rate highly on this measure as
much of their service is to airports within the region.”221 “Cana-
dian hub airports are relatively small compared to major world
hub airports considering total passenger traffic, but in terms of
connectivity they fare better.”222
According to Clayton M. Christensen, professor at Harvard
Business School and pioneer of the disruptive innovation the-
ory, “disruptive innovation . . . [is] a process by which a product
or service takes root initially in simple applications at the bot-
tom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, eventu-
ally displacing established competitors.”223 As a result of that
process, disrupted products or services become more accessible
and affordable to a large population instead of a specific seg-
ment willing to pay higher prices.224
In a recent article of Harvard Business Review, Christensen et
al. explained the concept and basic tenets of disruptive innova-
tion theory. The process of disruption describes how a disrupter
enters a market or creates a new one and how it evolves from a
business oriented toward new customers or low-end to high-end
customers, while passing through the mainstream customers.225
Christensen et al. pointed out the confusion surrounding the
application of the concept of disruptive innovation when it is
used by many researchers, writers, and consultants. In that re-
gard, “disruptive innovation” is different from “sustaining inno-
vations,” which focuses on improving the products or services
offered to an incumbent’s existing customers—notably, the
most profitable ones.226 By contrast:
Disruptive innovations . . . are initially considered inferior by
most of an incumbent’s customers. Typically, customers are not
willing to switch to the new offering merely because it is less ex-
pensive. Instead, they wait until its quality rises enough to satisfy
220 Id.
221 Id. at 16.
222 Id.
223 What is Disruptive Health Technology?, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., DISRUPTIVE
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, http://www.dhti.cmu.edu/dhti/definition.asp
[https://perma.cc/LLT4-FN4N].
224 Id.
225 Clayton M. Christensen et al., “What is Disruptive Innovation?”, 93 HARV. BUS.
REV. 44, 46 (2015).
226 Id. at 46–47.
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them. Once that’s happened, they adopt the new product and
happily accept its lower price.227
Christensen et al. explained that “[d]isruptive innovations origi-
nate in low-end or new-market footholds.”228 New-market dis-
ruption occurs where a new market is created where none
previously existed, hence a new segment of customers is
targeted by a disrupter. Second, low-end disruption refers to the
situation where low-end and less-demanding customers of an es-
tablished business (incumbent) are attracted by progressive en-
hanced product/service offerings of a new entrant (disrupter).
The disrupter will later adapt its business strategy to the evolu-
tion of the market, whereas the incumbents will focus rather on
the most profitable and demanding customers by providing
them with “ever-improving products and services.”229
Based on the above reasoning, it appears that the business
model of the low-cost carriers (LCCs) fits overall into the new-
market disruption. This resulted in the emergence of a new seg-
ment of passengers who could not afford traveling by air before,
due to exorbitant airfares.230 Yet it is also true that the low-end
and mainstream passengers are attracted by the affordable
prices and improving service offerings of the low cost model
(i.e. low-end disruption).231 This dynamic of disruption and the
evolution of performance over time is continuously changing at
different paces, depending on the business models of the dis-
rupters and the incumbents, but also on the evolution of the
cyclic airline industry as a whole (i.e. Ultra LCCs, LCCs, hybrid
carriers, and legacy carriers).
227 Id. at 48.
228 Id. at 47.
229 Id.
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Another point worth mentioning is that a process of action
and reaction emerges from the dynamic of disruptive innova-
tion given that this concept can profoundly affect the function-
ing of established companies.232 This leads to what Christensen
called the “innovator’s dilemma,” which refers to the mindset of
an established company when it has to decide whether it should
maintain its products or services with the current high-value of-
ferings or create a new product or service similar to the one
offered by a disrupter.233 That said, the new product or service
must be designed with basic or less sophisticated attributes to be
able to compete with the new entrant, which targets mainstream
customers (e.g., Legacy carriers versus LCCs, Ford versus
Toyota).
The traditional airlines have been facing two types of disrup-
tions concurrently, which is “unusual in the story of disruption,”
according to Christensen.234 Thus, unlike incumbents in other
industries, traditional carriers cannot move to more profitable
upmarket tiers to maintain a certain competitive advantage over
the new entrants. Christensen explained that incumbents in
other industries have more options when disrupted, whereas
“[t]he high fixed-cost structure of hub-and-spoke airlines means
they can’t run away from the volume in the lower tiers of the
market.”235 In fact, with the growing competition from LCCs on
short-haul routes, traditional carriers in the United States and
Europe have been trying to focus on flowing passengers through
their hubs on longer routes.236 However, they are no longer in a
position of supremacy due to the fierce competition from the
Middle Eastern carriers on long-haul.237 Basically, the margins of
the traditional U.S. and European airlines are getting squeezed
on both sides—short- and long-haul.
232 Disruptive Innovation-Policy Implications, VISIONARY ANALYTICS (Jan. 2016),
http://www.visionary.lt/disruptive-innovation-policy-implications [https://per
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Nevertheless, contrary to LCCs, the major Middle Eastern car-
riers operate through a different business model that does not
necessarily target, at the very beginning, their operations, the
mainstream passengers, or a new-market segment. In fact, an-
other aspect that distinguishes the airline industry from other
industries is its dependency on different components of the
global air transport system; these include airport infrastructures,
geographic location, and national institutional policies. These
components combined would facilitate the process of disruption
when acting in an international market with different compara-
tive advantages. That said, favorable conditions, to a certain ex-
tent, might create an uneven playing field without being illegal,
as discussed earlier.
Within that perspective, many major airlines have benefited
from favorable conditions, which cannot be ignored in their de-
velopment history. Perhaps the time frame of these advantages
and the cyclic characteristic of the airline industry are the main
parameters that make it challenging to conduct a reasonable
comparison between the beneficiaries. For instance, as men-
tioned earlier, Emirates reported that it benefited from the gov-
ernment investment in infrastructure, plus start-up seed capital
in 1985.238 Other airlines have been rescued, either directly
through subsidies, or indirectly by application of bankruptcy
laws (e.g. United Airlines in 2006).239
Airlines adopt an aggressive strategy to leverage the compara-
tive advantages of a global disparate air transport system. How-
ever, the success of a new carrier relies above all on its ability to
seize new opportunities and meet an eventual pent-up demand
through a solid product offering in terms of quality and pric-
ing.240 In a similar approach, Abeyratne briefly explained his
definition of disruptive innovation in the airline industry based
on the constraints raised by Christensen:
Disruptive innovation in the air transport industry is based on
two strategies: service strategy and pricing strategy. These two
combined justify the three basic features of a successful business
strategy which displaces an existing market: availability of goods
and services; good price and quality; and value for money. When
238 AIRLINES AND SUBSIDY: OUR POSITION, supra note 132, at 8.
239 Adams, supra note 63.
240 See LCCs Playing Important Role in Driving Onboard Passenger Experience Im-
provements, FUTURE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE (June 2014), http://www.futuretravelex
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these practices are applied to the airline industry, one finds that
an established carrier is much more vulnerable to disruptive in-
novation than most other industries.241
Abeyratne explained a common misconception that considers
a decrease in innovation as an adverse effect of increased com-
petition. He clarified that, contrary to this erroneous assump-
tion, “[c]ompetition and innovation are mutually
endogenous.”242 Aghion et al. further described the
relationship:
First, an increase in competition leads to a significant increase in
R&D investments by neck-and-neck firms. Second, an increase in
competition decreases R&D investments by laggard firms. Moreo-
ver, this Schumpeterian effect243 is significantly stronger the
shorter the time horizon. Third, increased competition affects
industry composition by reducing the fraction of neck-and-neck
sectors, and overall, competition increases aggregate
innovation.244
Edwards and Day identified innovation as a crucial indicator
that enables a company to build an emotional brand connection
with its customers. They identified lack of real innovation as one
of the five symptoms of malaise of consumer-led brands.245
These are: (1) an increased similarity between brands; (2) an
inconsistent brand image and offer; (3) a lack of real innovation
and surprise; (4) an increasing gulf between brand offer and
brand capability; and (5) something hollow at the heart of the
brand.246 In that sense, Edwards and Day described Emirates as a
company with a record of successful brand innovation; that is,
“an example of rapid-fire innovation” offering many on-board
241 RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, COMPETITION AND INVESTMENT IN AIR TRANSPORT—
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 108 (2016).
242 Id. at 107.
243 “The Schumpeter effect is associated with the notion of creative destruction
put forward in the 1930s by the celebrated economist Joseph Schumpeter, which
introduced the process by which new innovations replace older technologies.
Start-up airlines have to be mindful of being overrun by more established air-
lines, making creative destruction a common phenomenon in air transport.” Id.
at n.84.
244 Philippe Agnion et al., The Causal Effects of Competition on Innovation: Experi-
mental Evidence 4 (Harvard University, Working Paper, 2014), http://scholar.
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886457 [https://perma.cc/8E4Q-ZWYA].
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options and innovative technologies to the passengers.247 Be-
sides, it was highlighted that the airline had not tested the intro-
duced innovations before the implementation stage. Tim Clark,
Emirates CEO, explained: “We know what consumers want, and
we use the experience of our own people to assess new ideas. If
we tested innovation every time with a posse of consumers, we
would lose the initiative. We prefer to back our judgement.”248
From a customer perspective, Emirates, Qatar Airways, and
Etihad Airways provide high levels of service, especially for pre-
mium passengers. As mentioned earlier, in 2016 these carriers
ranked first, second, and sixth, respectively, out of the 100 best
airlines by Skytrax World Airline Awards.249 On the other hand,
Delta ranked thirty-fifth, United ranked sixty-eighth, and Ameri-
can ranked seventy-seventh, according to the same Skytrax.250
That is, the three major U.S. airlines lagged behind the most
recognized carriers in terms of customer service, including leg-
acy and low-cost carriers based mostly in Asia (e.g. Singapore
Airlines (third), AirAsia (twenty-third)) and Europe (e.g. Luf-
thansa (tenth), Air France (fourteenth)). Per Canadian carriers,
Air Canada ranked thirty-first, ahead of WestJet (fiftieth), Porter
Airlines (forty-seventh), and Air Transat (eighty-eighth).251
Emirates has been successful in providing high quality service
to its passengers flying either economy, business, or first class.
According to Fortune magazine, the overall quality offered by
Emirates outstrips that of its rivals in Europe
>at both the top and bottom ends of the market. Customers in
Emirates’ economy class usually pay less compared with compet-
ing flights, while still receiving a superior level of service. Upper
class customers, meanwhile, usually pay more, but receive greater
exclusivity and comfort compared to upper class cabins on Euro-
pean airlines, especially in First Class . . . .252
Increasingly, many airlines have replaced first-class accommo-
dations with business-class seats. Some planes are reconfigured
to offer more capacity in competitive markets with potential ex-
isting and pent-up demand. However, for most airlines, the com-
247 Id. at 32.
248 Id. at 32–33.
249 The World’s Top 100 Airlines in 2016, supra note 147.
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2017] COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 389
fort differences between business class and first class are
shrinking, whereas the huge difference in price has not changed
accordingly.253
Emirates, the world’s largest A380 and Boeing 777 operator,
uses Dubai as both a hinterland hub for routes to other cities in
the Middle East and an hourglass hub for long-haul traffic.254
That is, they service global destinations by operating the sixth
freedom while connecting Europe to Australia and the United
States to Asia in addition to the fifth freedom route from New
York City to Milan continuing on to Dubai.255 According to de
Wit, the long-haul hourglass model and fleet composition (new
and fuel-efficient aircraft) allows Emirates to significantly lower
its cost per available seat-kilometer (CASK) more than its com-
petitors in Europe.256 In addition to all of the foregoing, Emir-
ates does not compete with the low-cost carriers, which operate
rather in short and medium haul, hence its ability to generate
high revenue per available seat-kilometer/mile (RASK/
RASM).257
With the regard to market share, the Gulf trio achieved 11%
of the international air market in 2012, as measured by available
seat miles.258 That is way beyond the 2% recorded in 2002. By
contrast, the market share of the U.S. airlines has decreased
from 14% to 11% during the same period.259 This upward trend
is expected to continue “growing by 12 to 15% annually this dec-
ade, according to IATA figures.”260
The advancement of Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways, Qatar
Airways, and Turkish Airlines—as “super-connectors” world-
wide—has turned the evolution of the airline industry upside
down. From 2003 to 2013, these airlines have achieved tremen-
253 Joan Voight, Emirates is the World’s Most Glamorous Airline, ADWEEK (Oct. 12,
2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/emirates-worlds-
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dous performance in terms of revenue passenger kilometer
(RPK).261 The Middle Eastern carriers are expanding their net-
works, taking advantage of their strategic location between Eu-
rope, Asia, Africa, and America.262 This constitutes a highly
competitive advantage that allows these carriers to operate the
fifth and sixth freedoms using their state-of-the-art hubs. By do-
ing so, it is not a surprise that fares seem to be low on some
routes “because of the efficiency of their long-haul-to-long-haul
model.”263
Overall, the three Middle Eastern carriers seem to achieve
common objectives by enhancing the connectivity between the
four corners of the world. They operate in different but comple-
mentary strategies to ensure the growth of their network: Open
Skies for Emirates, equity minority interests for Etihad, and alli-
ances for Qatar Airways.264 As a result, this strategy is continu-
ously challenging the other legacy carriers, which have
traditionally operated direct routes between “strong local mar-
kets,” including the local market of the flag carriers.265 Accord-
ingly, the three Middle Eastern carriers have raised competition
to a new level in the international air travel market.
To conclude, as long as the allegations against the major Mid-
dle Eastern carriers—Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways and
Qatar Airways—are not proven to distort the market, passengers
are left with no choice but to admit that these carriers are dis-
ruptive innovators in the air travel industry.
V. CONCLUSION
In their analysis of Gulf carrier competition with U.S. airlines,
Dresner et al. said: “Claims that the Gulf carriers have an unfair
competitive advantage and harm local markets and airlines have
resulted in ‘a barrage of legal and political challenges to the
Gulf carriers’ and calls to restrict further Gulf carrier access to
markets in Europe and Canada, for example.”266 “[T]he West’s
legacy airlines have not lacked for state protection of their
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own,”267 yet it seems that the situation is changing when the De-
partment of Justice has expressed concern over limiting Gulf
carrier competition.268 Perhaps policy makers are concerned
about protecting the interests of other stakeholders, such as
Boeing and big U.S. airports, which benefit from the tremen-
dous growth of the Middle-Eastern carriers.
In June 2016, the State Department held separate meetings to
hear the concerns of two main groups of aviation stakeholders
with respect to the alleged subsidies. The first group included
players who oppose the position of the three U.S. airlines, in-
cluding FedEx, Alaska Air Group, JetBlue Airways, Hawaiian
Holdings, and the U.S. Travel Association. The second group
represented mainly the plaintiff (i.e the three major U.S. air-
lines) and several airline labor unions.269 Thereafter, in July
2016, the State Department held informal meetings with Qatar
and UAE government officials.270 While no official announce-
ments have been made yet, some sources reported a victory for
the Middle Eastern carriers and others reported that both sides
claimed triumph following the informal meetings.271 Besides,
the State Department is expected not to request official consul-
tations despite the intense lobbying from the three major U.S.
airlines.272 Another meeting is expected “in the coming months”
according to UAE Economy Minister Sultan Saeed Al
Mansouri.273
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In the context of Canada, the current approach toward re-
strictive bilateral ASAs with countries like the UAE benefits its
national carrier Air Canada, but not consumers.274 Therefore,
passengers [and tourists] are left with no choice but to pay high
taxes and bear the cost of investments on airports.275 This situa-
tion probably persists because the Canadian company Bombar-
dier has not benefited from the expanding Middle Eastern
carriers’ large aircraft orders for long-haul flights, as U.S. com-
panies Boeing and Airbus have.276 Perhaps the new liberal Tru-
deau-led government may reconsider the merits of maintaining
Canada’s existing policy settings.
The aforesaid analysis of this article highlighted the conflict
of interest with regard to subsidy allegations against the three
major Middle Eastern carriers. This conflict might lead to politi-
cal risks as a result of widely advertised allegations, which are
fueled by accusations, counter-accusations, or rebuttals on the
basis of analysis conducted separately by both sides. When such
accusations persist with no way out, it is also because of a weak
regulatory framework with respect to the procedure of settle-
ment of disputes.
It must be noted that competition should not sound like a
threat, but instead a driving force of an engine that requires
checks on a regular basis. In other words, the process of air
transport liberalization must be continuously assessed from both
national and international perspectives. In fact, liberalization
does not imply a shift toward less or weak regulation, but on the
contrary, a milestone on the path towards a comprehensive ap-
proach for a strengthened and proactive regulation. That is, an
approach by which competent bodies should put more empha-
sis on the continuous assessment of both effects and counter-
effects of global regulatory measures. All of that requires
growth-enhancing investments all along the process of
liberalization.
The demand stimulation is of interest to global stakeholders,
but at different levels; in fact, low fares as a result of the demand
stimulation do not necessarily work in favor of airlines whose
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profit margins are the worst in the air transport chain. Besides,
the quality of service and passengers’ rights are often compro-
mised in the midst of growing demand. Hence the importance
of a proactive and collaborative approach to achieve applicable
regulations, to be elaborated and enhanced in concert with di-
verse stakeholders; the latter must include the passengers who
are still very poorly represented in the global air transport
system.
On the other hand, in a restricted market, regulations are
generally rigid and contain clauses designed to protect the inter-
ests of (almost) one major player—the national carriers. Some-
times it is even difficult to tell who these clauses and regulatory
texts benefit as a whole: the regulatory bodies or the flag
carriers?
That being said, a comprehensive and proactive regulation
has to take into consideration the disparate interests of the
global community, where the end-users (passengers) are sup-
posed to be the core of the air transport system as a whole (i.e.
they are the raison d’eˆtre of the businesses and, most importantly,
the regulators). Yet this is not the part that the main stakehold-
ers would argue about when assessing a certain policy, but
rather the weight attributed to different effects and counter-ef-
fects. Consequently, a balanced analysis is needed to assess exis-
tent and potential impacts of liberalization on each of the
various stakeholders, many of which are emphasised in this arti-
cle. In fact, it is clear that there is often a conflict of interest to
be considered when political interests are on the table. In such a
case, it would be a conflict in which one of the stakeholders
might be considered a secondary player.
In that regard, a cost-benefit analysis should be considered for
a balanced assessment of the current and potential impacts of a
liberalization policy. The impacts on connectivity, tourism, em-
ployment, airlines, and other related industries (e.g. aircraft
manufacturers in the United States and Europe) are among the
areas that should be assessed in a cost-benefit analysis frame-
work. On the basis of this, eventual corrective measures or regu-
latory texts, if any, could be recommended. Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, the assessment of air transport liberalization
must be conducted on a regular basis. In that sense, the
database and methodology of QUASAR is an important tool de-
signed by the WTO to assess the degree of liberalization
achieved by using a synthetic universal index, Air Liberalisation
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Index (ALI).277 QUASAR methodology is carried out using four
steps. The first is assessing the degree of liberalization of an ASA
(i.e. the level of openness of the main market access features of
bilateral ASAs) to construct a synthetic universal index, the
ALI.278 For that purpose, the value of an ALI is determined by
summing the attributed “points” to various features and their
variant ASA provisions (e.g. capacity, withholding, tariffs, and
designation).279 “The value of [an] ALI varies between zero, for
very restrictive ASAs, and fifty, for very liberal ones.”280 The sec-
ond step is categorizing ASAs by type; seven standard types of
ASAs have been identified by combining the different clauses of
an ASA relating to freedoms of air, capacity, withholding, tariffs,
and designation.281 The third step is combining the calculated
ALIs with traffic data so as to obtain a Weighted ALI (WALI) by
contracting state, region, pair of regions, type, level of traffic,
etc.282 For a given contracting State, the WALI provides an ag-
gregate measure of the openness of its aviation policy.283 The
fourth step is comparing the ASA network with the commercial
network, which corresponds to the services that are effectively
operated by airlines.284
Throughout this process, WTO works in concert with other
stakeholders such as ICAO and IATA depending upon the data
required by this analysis.285 ICAO has an important role to play
in integrating this methodology in its TASA and facilitating its
adoption by member States. But beforehand, ICAO should as-
sist, in coordination with WTO, its member States in determin-
ing how to evaluate their air transport liberalization policy using
QUASAR methodology.
Any concerns are to be resolved in a spirit of cooperation and
in accordance with regulations in force, which should not be
limited to the provisions of the bilateral ASAs when the subject
matter of a mutual dispute is not covered by an existing ASA, as
discussed earlier in this article (i.e. WTO and commercial dis-
277 WTO Secretariat, Part A: Introduction to QUASAR, WTO Doc. S/C/W/270,
12 (Nov. 30, 2006).
278 Id. at 11.
279 Id. at 12.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 16. Over 70% of QUASAR bilateral ASAs fall under one of these seven
types. Id.
282 Id. at 17.
283 See id.
284 Id. at 18.
285 See id. at 10.
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putes). Most importantly, any compromise must not ignore pas-
senger rights. In fact, it is in nations’ overall interest to serve the
fundamental need of the people in terms of air transport con-
nectivity. This will not be possible without a clear vision and con-
crete actions through a proactive approach. Clearly, “[v]ision
without action is a daydream . . . [and a]ction without vision is a
nightmare.”286
286 Japanese Proverb, Quotes, QUOTES, http://quotes.net/quote/8027 [https:/
/perma.cc/272B-MM8H].
